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Abstract
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price
mechanism can deter the formation of bidding rings. However, such analyses ne-
glect to consider the effects of failed collusion attempts, wherein information re-
vealed in the negotiation process may affect bidding behavior. We experimentally
test a setup in which theory predicts no collusion and no information revelation
in first-price auctions. The results reveal a hitherto overlooked failing of the first-
price mechanism: failed collusion attempts distort bidding behavior, resulting in a
loss of seller revenue and efficiency. Moreover, the first-price mechanism does not
result in less collusion than the second-price mechanism. We conclude that, while
the features of the first-price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder
collusion, the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behavior make it highly suscepti-
ble to distortions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation.
Auction designers should take this phenomenon into account when choosing the
auction mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Bidder collusion poses a major impediment for auctions. By colluding, members of
the colluding cartel—also known in the literature as a bidding ring—can improve
their respective outcomes and substantially reduce the auctioneer’s revenues. Re-
cent studies have documented the prevalence of bidder collusion across sundry do-
mains (Asker, 2010; Hendricks and Porter, 1989; Pesendorfer, 2000; Porter and
Zona, 1999)1 and it is now acknowledged as a major challenge for optimal auction
design (Klemperer, 2002; Marshall et al., 2014).
Collusive negotiations reveal private information and affect the bidders’ beliefs
regarding private values of other bidders. If negotiations break down and bidders
bid competitively, the effect on beliefs may extend to altering bidding strategies.
The auction designer can take this into account, creating incentives for cartel mem-
bers to misrepresent their private information, thus inhibiting successful collusive
negotiations.2 Specifically, theory predicts that the first-price mechanism deters
collusion due to the opportunities to manipulate the other party’s beliefs that arise
in the bargaining process, as compared to the second-price mechanism, where op-
timal bidding does not depend on beliefs. On the other hand, if information is
revealed but negotiations break down (which in many theoretical models never
happens in equilibrium), the effect on the bidders’ beliefs may drastically distort
bidding in first-price auctions, whereas the second-price mechanism is immune to
such distortions.
In this paper, we study the implications of information revelation in collusive
bargaining in first-price and second-price auctions. We test the theoretical predic-
tion that the first-price mechanism deters collusion, and provide the first systematic
study of the effects of failed collusive bargaining on subsequent bidding. We study
experimentally first-price and second-price private-values auctions with two bid-
ders. The baseline treatments follow the tradition of the seminal papers that study
first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions (Cox et al., 1982; Kagel and Levin,
1993). In these treatments, subjects bid for an object without previous interac-
tion with the other bidder. In the collusion treatments, one bidder can ‘bribe’ the
other bidder to stay out of the auction, leaving the remaining bidder free to win the
auction at the seller’s reserve price.3
1 A large proportion of court cases pursued under U.S. antitrust laws deal with auction markets (Agra-
nov and Yariv, 2014; Froeb and Shor, 2005).
2 Deterrence can also be achieved by way of sanctions levied on cartel members. We abstract from
such considerations to isolate the effects of the incentives created by the auction mechanism on top of
existing legal mechanisms.
3 In order to focus on the effects of information revelation, we assume that bribes are committing.
This is possible when the cartel can prevent members from bidding (McAfee and McMillan, 1992), or can
submit bids in the name of the members (Marshall and Marx, 2007). A large body of literature analyzes the
commitment problem, showing that, under general assumptions, first-price auctions have the potential to
deter collusion. As the bidder assigned by the cartel to win the auction must place a low bid, other cartel
members can enter and win the auction contrary to the terms of the collusive agreement (e.g., Marshall
2
In the experiment, the collusive agreement is reached through a simple ultima-
tum bargaining protocol, in which one bidder (the proposer) can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the other bidder (the responder). The responder can choose whether
to accept the offer and consequently refrain from bidding in the auction or to reject
the offer and participate in the auction.
This particular type of bargaining protocol is well suited for our experimental
examination for several reasons. First, it is highly structured and simple to un-
derstand, thus serving as an ideal environment in which to study the implications
of information revelation in collusive bargaining. Second, it has been analyzed in
the theoretical literature for second-price auctions (Eső and Schummer, 2004) and
first-price auctions (Rachmilevitch, 2013). These papers illuminate the deterrence
properties of the first-price mechanism. Whereas Eső and Schummer (2004) proved
the existence (and, under a mild refinement, uniqueness) of a collusive equilibrium
in second-price auctions, Rachmilevitch (2013) proved that, assuming undominated
bidding and a pure, continuous, and monotonic bribing function, no bribes are of-
fered in the unique equilibrium of the first-price auction. This result illustrates
how the effects of information revelation on bidding in first-price—but not second-
price—auctions lead to the breakdown of collusion, as proposers have incentives to
misrepresent their private information.
Finally, the simple bargaining protocol is well suited for the study of failed col-
lusive bargaining, as it generates such failures as a natural part of the mechanism.
The theoretical model we build on thus provides a useful benchmark to guide this
first experimental study of failed collusive bargaining. As such, it should be viewed
as a workhorse designed to capture the essential features of collusive bargaining
that we aim to study rather than a realistic model of real-world collusion.
Our results can be organized into two main findings. First, the experimental
data reject the theoretical prediction that there are substantial differences in brib-
ing behavior between first-price and second-price auctions. Second, the bargaining
process has dramatic effects on bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price)
auctions, leading to a substantial drop in seller revenue and efficiency. Our empir-
ical analysis is able to attribute this loss of efficiency to a selection effect arising
from failed bargaining. Bribe offers are likely to be accepted when proposers have
a relatively high value and responders a relatively low value. This leads to a posi-
tive bias in the distribution of responder values in the auction and a negative bias
for the proposer values. Proposers in the resulting asymmetric auction bid higher
than responders who have the same private value (but face a lower distribution
of opponents’ values). Consequently, proposers often win the auction even if the
responder’s value is higher. A best-response analysis confirms that rational bidders
should bid asymmetrically in the auction and that actual bids follow, on average,
the optimal pattern.
Thus, our paper brings to light an hitherto overlooked principle: while the fea-
tures of the first-price mechanism may have the potential to deter bidder collusion,
and Marx, 2007; Robinson, 1985).
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the role of beliefs in guiding bidding behavior make it highly susceptible to distor-
tions arising from the informational properties of collusive negotiation. In this, our
paper contributes to two distinct literatures. First, the literature informing auction
design, specifically on how to use the auction mechanism to counter collusion at-
tempts. The consensus in the theoretical literature is that the first-price mechanism
has the power to deter bidder collusion (Marshall and Marx, 2012). We bring to
the discussion a new consideration, which auction designers should take this phe-
nomenon into account when choosing the auction mechanism. Second, our paper
contributes to the literature on bargaining. Most theoretical and empirical analyses
of bargaining assume that failure to reach an agreement results in a known disagree-
ment allocation. Recent treatments in cooperative game theory have explored the
implications of endogenizing the disagreement point as a function of the strategic
environment (Bozbay et al., 2012; Vartiainen, 2007). In contrast, we explore an
environment in which the disagreement point depends on private information and
on the players’ actions in the bargaining stage.
2 Related literature
Although we are the first to test the informational effects of collusion on bidding
behavior, several experiments have studied the more general question of how the
auction mechanism affects collusion. These mostly look at situations where collu-
sion is not directly enforceable, where the first price mechanism can deter collusion
by providing opportunities for cartel members to renege on the collusive agreement
(Lopomo et al., 2011; Marshall and Marx, 2007; Robinson, 1985). In a pioneer
experiment, Isaac and Walker (1985) found that unstructured communication sub-
stantially increases collusion in first price auctions, mainly through bid rotation
in repeated interactions.4 Later experiments introduced other auction mechanisms
and compared their success in deterring collusion in different environments. Several
studies found that, even without communication or side payments, an ascending
bid mechanism results in more collusion than uniform or discriminatory sealed bid
mechanisms in multi-unit auctions (Alsemgeest et al., 1998; Burtraw et al., 2009;
Goeree et al., 2013; Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2007). Agranov and Yariv (2014)
compared first-price and second-price auctions with unstructured communication
and side payments, using a stranger design to rule out bid rotation. They found
that post-auction side payments dramatically increased collusion, while the auction
mechanism had no significant effect on collusion with or without side payments.
Hinloopen and Onderstal (2013) tested the Robinson (1985) model explicitly,
comparing first-price and ascending-bid auctions in a minimal setting where all
three bidders share a commonly known value and vote on whether to collude. Side
payments were exogenously set at one-quarter of the value paid to each of the
4 Vyrastekova and Montero (2002) did not find that structured communication had any effect in a
setting where restricted bid space gives rise to a collusive equilibrium in a repeated game.
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two designated losers. In this setting, all cartels break down under the first-price
mechanism, reducing the loss of revenue from collusion compared to the ascending-
bid mechanism. Hu et al. (2011) studied a richer environment with private values,
where the revelation mechanism used to form the cartel includes a knockout auction
and the collusive agreement is enforceable. Bidders were more likely to collude
under the first-price mechanism compared to the ascending-bid mechanism, which
the authors attribute to the higher gains expected from collusion given overbidding
in first-price auctions. In asymmetric auctions, where strong bidders can collude, a
premium auction format was more successful in deterring collusion than both the
first-price and the ascending-bid mechanisms. Although the cartel agreement in
Hu et al. (2011) was committing—as in our setting, and unlike in that of Agranov
and Yariv (2014) and Hinloopen and Onderstal (2013)—designated losers could not
use any private information revealed in the knockout auction, as they had already
committed to not bidding in the preceding voting stage. Consequently, there was
no scope for any effects of information revelation on bidding behavior.
Our paper differs from these papers in that collusive agreements are commit-
ting, but bargaining may break down. This allows us to cleanly identify the effects
of information revelation in collusive bargaining. Furthermore, by specifying the
bargaining protocol we are able to generate theoretical predictions without assum-
ing a centralized revelation mechanism, which is not always feasible as it requires
an impartial third party to implement.
3 Model
3.1 Setup
The experiment implements a special case of the model introduced by Eső and
Schummer (2004). Two risk-neutral bidders, p (the proposer) and r (the respon-
der), are bidding for a single indivisible object for which they have valuations θp
and θr respectively. θp and θr are drawn independently from the uniform distri-
bution over [0, 100]. Everything is commonly known except the valuations, which
are privately known by the bidders.
The game proceeds in two stages. In the collusion stage, the proposer can offer
any amount b to the responder to refrain from bidding. If the responder accepts
the offer, the proposer automatically wins the auction at the reserve price, which
is set at zero.5 If the receiver rejects the offer, both bidders proceed to the auction
stage, which can take the form of either a first-price or second-price auction. In the
auction stage, both bidders simultaneously bid for the object and the bidder with
5 We set the reserve price at zero in order to simplify the experimental design. The comparative
statics and the hypotheses in this section are robust to positive reserve prices as long as they are below the
maximum possible valuation (see p. 302 in Eső and Schummer (2004) and p. 220 in Rachmilevitch (2013)
for the predictions in the collusion treatments).
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the highest bid receives it. In the first-price auction the winner pays her posted
bid, while in the second-price auction the winner pays the bid posted by the other
bidder.
Formally, the strategy of the proposer is a tuple {b(θp), cp(θp)}, where b(θp) is
a bribing function mapping types into offers, b : [0, 100] → R+, and cp(θp) is a
bidding function mapping types into bids, cp : [0, 100] → R+. The strategy of the
responder is a tuple {a(b, θr), cr(b, θr)}, where a(b, θr) is an acceptance function
determining whether a bribe is accepted for each bribe offered and responder type,
a : R+ × [0, 100] −→ {0, 1}, and cr(b, θr) is a bidding function mapping types
and bribes into bids, cp : R+ × [0, 100] → R+.
3.2 Equilibria
Consider first the game without the collusion stage. In the case of a second-price
auction, bidders should play their weakly dominant strategy of bidding their value.
In the first-price auction, for the case of the uniform distribution, bidders should bid
half of their valuation. This results in efficient allocations and equivalent revenues
across mechanisms (Krishna, 2009).
Let us turn now to the game with the collusion stage. Eső and Schummer (2004)
characterized the sequential equilibria for the case of second-price auctions, restrict-
ing the analysis to continuous bribing strategies, and assuming that players play the
weakly dominant strategy in the auction stage. Eső and Schummer (2004, page 309)
showed that when types are distributed uniformly, there exists a unique sequential





2θp if θp ∈ [0, 2003 ),
100
3 if θp ∈ [2003 , 100],
a(b, θr) =
{
1 if b ≥ θr3 ,
0 if b < θr3 ,
(1)
and in the case where they proceed to the auction stage, both bidders play their dom-
inant strategy and bid their valuation—i.e., cp(θp) = θp and cr(b, θr) = θr. As the
bribe does not affect the auction behavior, the equilibrium bribing function b(θp)
simply balances the probability that the responder accepts and the amount that the
proposer needs to pay in case the responder accepts. Similarly, the acceptance func-
tion a(b, θr) is based on a simple comparison of the bribe to the expected profit in
the auction. Given the equilibrium bribing function, a responder who is offered a
bribe b < 1003 believes that the proposer’s value is θp = 2b. It follows that if both
bidders go to the auction and bid their true values, the responder’s payoff will be
max(0, θr − 2b), hence any b ≥ θr3 should be accepted. If the bribe is b = 1003 ,
then the expected value of going to the auction is lower than b, and therefore the
bribe should always be accepted.
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The unique equilibrium features two interesting properties. First, bribes are
offered and accepted with positive probability. Second, equilibrium allocations are




), the responder accepts the
bribe offer made by the proposer, who consequently wins the auction despite having
a lower value.
Rachmilevitch (2013) analyzed the case for the first-price auction to show that
if the bribing function is monotonic and continuous,6 and under the assumption
that no player bids more than her true value, the unique weak-perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in pure strategies is a trivial equilibrium in which no bribe offers are
made.7
The intuition for this result is the following. In equilibrium, a proposer with
valuation 0 must offer a bribe of 0. Continuity and monotonicity imply that b(θp) =
0 on some interval θp ∈ [0, θ′]. If θ′ = 0, all positive types have an incentive to offer
an arbitrarily small bribe b(ϵ), leading the proposer to believe that the proposer has
a low value ϵ. Consequently, the responder will believe that a bid of ϵ or above is
weakly dominated for the proposer. The responder will therefore bid at most ϵ. The
proposer can thus gain close to her full value by deviating to a bribe offer of b(ϵ)
and a bid of slightly higher than ϵ in the ensuing auction. If θ′ > 0, the θ′ type
has an incentive to deviate and offer a small positive bribe b(θ′ + δ), which will be
accepted by all types θ < θ′ + δ, who believe they will lose the auction. Note that
his result holds for any level of risk aversion. We refer the reader to Rachmilevitch
(2013) for the complete proof.
4 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment implemented the game described in Section 3. We manipulated the
availability of collusion and the auction mechanism in a 2×2 between-subjects de-
sign. Participants in the experiments played 50 rounds of the game. In treatments
FPA-COL and SPA-COL, each round consisted of a collusion stage and an auction
stage (first price and second price, respectively). In the baseline treatments FPA-
NOCOL and SPA-NOCOL, collusion was not possible, so each round started directly
with the auction stage. The roles of proposer and responder were randomly as-
signed at the beginning of the session and remained fixed throughout the session.
Each session consisted of 12 proposers and 12 responders, who were rematched in
6 Kotowski and Rachmilevitch (2014) showed that the proof also requires that the cumulative value
distribution to be weakly concave, which is satisfied by the uniform distribution that we study.
7 Rachmilevitch (2013) also showed the existence of other equilibria when bidding above the valuation
is allowed. In such equilibria, bidders with low valuations reveal their identity through the bribing function
and all higher types offer a common bribe. In case of reaching the auction stage, proposers with lower
valuations bid above their value and the responders bid slightly above that. While this is technically
possible, bidding above the valuation is rare in the data and happened in only 3 out of 1388 observations
in the first-price auction with collusion treatment.
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each round within matching groups of eight participants.8 See the appendix for a
translation of the instructions.
Private valuations were (known to be) independently drawn from a uniform
distribution over [0, 100]. To keep with the theoretical assumption of continuity,
values could be any round multiplication of 0.01 within the range. Bribe offers and
bids were similarly restricted to be in the range [0, 100] in steps of 0.01. That is,
values, offers, and bids could each take one of 10, 001 different values.
In each round, participants were first informed of their private values. In the
FPA-COL and SPA-COL treatments, the proposer was then asked to choose an amount
to offer the responder in exchange for staying out of the auction. Proposers could
choose not to make an offer to the responder by entering an offer of zero, in which
case the two participants proceeded directly to the auction stage. If a positive offer
was made, the responder was asked to choose whether to accept or reject the offer.
Acceptance resulted in the round ending, with the proposer receiving her private
value minus the offered amount and the responder receiving the offered amount. In
case of rejection, the auction stage commenced. In the auction stage, both players
entered a bid, with the highest bidder receiving her private value and paying her
bid (in the FPA treatments) or the other player’s bid (in the SPA treatments). The
round ended with a feedback screen, providing participants with complete infor-
mation about the round.9
Since the reasoning behind the unraveling of bribing in first-price auctions is
subtle and requires several steps, we took the following steps in all treatments to
facilitate understanding of the game and provide participants with an optimal envi-
ronment for reaching equilibrium. First, we made sure that participants understood
the payoff structures using standard control questions. Second, after the control
questions and before the role assignment, participants played a number of practice
rounds, in which each participant made all of the decisions in both roles.10 This
allowed participants to freely experiment with different bribing and bidding strate-
gies. Last, the feedback provided at the end of each round encompassed the full
round history, including the (typically unobservable) value and bid of the other
player.11
The sessions were conducted in May 2013 and April 2014 at the BonnEconLab.
We ran two sessions per treatment, with 24 participants in each session, and 192
8 This matching scheme balances the aim of maximizing the number of independent observations and
the aim of minimizing repeated play effects. To further minimize repeated play effects, participants were
not told that rematching would be within subgroups of eight.
9Feedback included the valuations of both players, the bribe amount and whether it was accepted or
rejected, and in the case where they went to auction, both bids.
10 Participants received 10 minutes, in which they could repeat the procedure for at least two, but not
more than five, rounds.
11The evidence of the effect of feedback is mixed. Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) found that revealing the
losing bid instead of the winning bid increases bidding. Katušcák et al. (2015) found that ex ante knowledge
of posterior feedback has no systematic effect on bidding behavior. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no study that studies the effect of revealing both bids and valuations.
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participants in total. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007), and the invitation of participants wasmanaged using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015),
which guaranteed that no subject participated in more than one session. Five of
the 50 rounds were randomly chosen for payment. Experimental earnings were
specified in Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which were converted to euros at
the end of the experiment at a conversion rate of 10 ECU = 1e. Final payoffs
ranged from 3e to 37e, with an average of 17.92e per participant.
4.1 Hypotheses
Based on the results presented in section 3, we formulate our research hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1. Proposers are more likely to offer bribes and offer, on average, higher
bribes, in SPA than in FPA.
Hypothesis 1 implies that outcomes in FPA-COL are more efficient than in SPA-
COL, where collusion substantially reduces efficiency. We measure efficiency both
by the proportion of auctions resulting in an efficient allocation and by the relative
loss of efficiency, defined as the ratio of the value of the auction winner to the
higher value of the two.
Hypothesis 2. The proportion of inefficient allocations and relative loss of efficiency
are higher in SPA-COL than in FPA-COL.
Finally, a consequence of the theoretical results is that the revenue equivalence
theorem (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) breaks, leading to higher
revenues in FPA.
Hypothesis 3. Seller revenue is higher in FPA-COL than in SPA-COL.
Interestingly, Hypotheses 2 and 3 run contrary to the typical observation in ex-
perimental auctions that first-price auctions lead to higher seller revenue and lower
efficiency than in second price auctions (Kagel, 1995). To allow for these empiri-
cal consistencies, we ran the no-collusion FPA-NOCOL and SPA-NOCOL treatments;
this provided a benchmark against which to test Hypotheses 2 and 3.12
5 Results
We start this section by describing and analyzing the collusion-stage behavior and
outcomes. After establishing that, contrary to the theoretical predictions, the auc-
tion mechanism has little effect on collusion, we proceed with analyzing the auction
12 Note that a model of heterogeneous risk aversion (e.g., the CRRAM model in Cox et al., 1982, 1988)
is able to accommodate both our theoretical predictions and the empirical consistencies observed in the
experiments, as the assumption of risk neutrality plays no role in the proof of Theorem 1 in Rachmilevitch
(2013) (which states that no bribes are offered in the continuous equilibrium of the first-price auction). In
the second-price auctions analyzed by Eső and Schummer (2004), risk aversion would alter the functional
form of the equilibrium specified in (1), but not its existence.
9
stage to show that the bargaining process in the first stage has substantial effects on
bidding behavior in FPA but not in SPA. We conclude the results section by report-
ing efficiency and seller’s revenue, followed by a best-response analysis. We report
the results based on all 50 periods. Although we observe some learning, changes in
behavior are fairly homogeneous across treatments, such that all the results hold if
we restrict the analysis to second half of the experiment.
5.1 The collusion stage
5.1.1 Proposer behavior
Figure 1 depicts bribing behavior in the collusion stage. The figure displays the
raw bribes and mean bids by value intervals of 5 in treatments FPA-COL (Panel (a))
and SPA-COL (Panel (b)). The comparison of bribes presented in Figure 1 reveals
that, contrary to Hypothesis 1, bribe levels are very similar in FPA and SPA. Al-
though bribes are higher in SPA for intermediate values, the difference is negligi-
ble. The regressions presented in Table 1 confirm this conclusion. Table 1 reports
regressions of bribes on the value of the proposer, auction type, interactions, and
period.13 In contrast to the theoretical prediction, the significant constant term in
the regressions shows that bribes are significantly positive even for values close to
zero. Although the effect of the proposer’s value on the offered bribe slightly differs
between SPA and FPA, this difference disappears in the second half of the exper-
iment. Furthermore, the marginal effect of the auction mechanism on the bribe,
calculated using the Delta method (Dorfman, 1938) from the regression equation
in column (1), is not significant at any level of the proposer’s value (p > 0.390
for all comparisons). There is some evidence of learning in the initial periods, with
mean bribes decreasing over the first part of the experiment and stabilizing later.
Notwithstanding this evidence, all of the following analyses are based on the full
dataset. All of the results hold if we restrict the analysis to the second half of the
experiment, where no further learning effects are apparent.
Recall that the equilibrium strategy in SPA is piecewise linear, which can only be
approximated with the polynomial equation estimated in the regressions. Therefore
we estimated a piecewise linear model of the form
Bribe =
{
α+ β1Value if Value < γ,
α+ β1γ + β2Value if Value ≥ γ.
(2)
The equilibrium prediction is α = 0, β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0, and γ = 100 · 23 .
Table 2 presents the result of a non-linear regression with robust standard errors
clustered on matching groups.14 In line with the equilibrium prediction, bribes
13We include V alue2 in the regression due to the curvature observed in the average bribe functions in
Figure 1.
14 The corresponding analysis for FPA yields essentially identical results. We do not report it here, as
the theoretical benchmark is not relevant for FPA.
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Table 1: Regressions on bribes.
(1) (2) (3)
All First 25 Last 25
Periods Periods Periods
Value 0.374*** 0.304*** 0.415***
(0.029) (0.047) (0.031)
Value2 -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SPA -0.858 -3.011 0.342
(1.927) (2.465) (1.877)
SPA x Value 0.089* 0.190** 0.042
(0.041) (0.065) (0.044)
SPA x Value2 -0.001* -0.002** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Period -0.308*** -0.586*** -0.260
(0.042) (0.133) (0.261)
Period2 0.005*** 0.015** 0.004
(0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
Constant 4.548** 6.680*** 4.400
(1.439) (1.908) (4.999)
Observations 2,400 1,200 1,200
Number of groups 12 12 12
Notes: Random effects for subjects nested in matching groups. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.05,
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Figure 1: Bribes in first-price and second-price auctions.
Note: Scatter plot of raw bribes and mean bids by value intervals of 5. The thin
dashed line marks the theoretical equilibrium predictions.
do not increase above a certain cutoff point, as β2 is not significantly different
from zero. The estimated cutoff point γ is, however, significantly lower than the
theoretical cutoff point of 2003 . Bribes are significantly lower than predicted, with
the estimated slope of the bribing function β1 equal to 0.2 and significantly below
the predicted 0.5.15 As a result, 81.9% of all bribes observed in SPA are lower than
predicted.
Result 1. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we observe no significant differences in bribing
behavior between first-price and second-price auctions. Bribes in FPA (SPA) are substan-
tially and significantly higher (lower) than predicted by the equilibrium analysis.
5.1.2 Responder behavior
Figure 2 depicts the acceptance responses in FPA and SPA as a function of the re-
sponder’s value and the bribe. Dark regions indicate acceptance, and light ones
indicate rejection. Recall that the theoretical equilibrium strategy in SPA is to ac-
cept any bribe that is above one third of the responder’s value. This strategy is
15 Constraining the non-significant β2 to be zero, we find that the estimated γ is 55.180, which is not
significantly lower than predicted in equilibrium. The estimated β1 is 0.182, even slightly lower than in
Table 2, and significantly lower than the equilibrium prediction.
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Table 2: Piecewise linear regression on bribes.
coefficient Robust S.E. 95% CI Equilibrium
α 7.586 0.413 6.523 8.648 0
β1 0.200 0.026 0.134 0.267 0.5
β2 0.028 0.038 -0.070 0.126 0
γ 47.110 3.901 37.082 57.138 66.66
Notes: Non-linear regression estimating Equation (2) with robust standard er-




















Figure 2: Bribe acceptance in first-price and second-price auctions.
Note: Acceptance choices by responder’s value and offered bribe. Dark regions indi-
cate acceptance and light ones indicate rejection. The black line marks the theoretical
acceptance threshold in SPA.
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Table 3: Regressions on bribe acceptance.
(1) (2) (3)
FPA SPA FPA & SPA
Value -0.204*** -0.110*** -0.200***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.015)




SPA x Value 0.089***
(0.016)
SPA x Bribe -0.211***
(0.043)
Period 0.040*** 0.027*** 0.032***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Constant -0.318 -1.037* -0.149
(0.457) (0.422) (0.407)
Observations 1,200 1,200 2,400
Number of groups 6 6 12
Value/Bribe ratio in FPA 0.382 0.382
95% CI [0.361 – 0.404] [0.360 – 0.404]
Value/Bribe ratio in SPA 0.357 0.356
95% CI [0.327 – 0.386] [0.327 – 0.386]
Notes: Mixed effects logistic regression with random effects for subjects nested in matching groups.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
14
marked by the black line in the figure. Choices roughly follow the theoretical equi-
librium strategy, as the equilibrium line in the figure can be seen to separate the
acceptance and rejection regions. As with proposer behavior, acceptance choices
in FPA are very similar to the ones in SPA.
Table 3 reports a set of logistic regressions of the acceptance decision on re-
sponder’s value and offered bribe. As can also be seen in Figure 2, responders are
more likely to accept the bribe offer when it is higher and when their own value
is lower. The significant interaction terms with auction mechanism indicate that
acceptance is more sensitive to both bribe and value in FPA than in SPA; however,
these differences are minor. Finally, responders learn to accept more bribes with
experience.16
The regression results also serve to characterize the acceptance threshold by esti-
mating the line where responders are indifferent between acceptance and rejection.
In terms of the regression, this implies a predicted probability of 0.5 for acceptance.
We assume, in line with the theoretical analysis, that the bribe at which the respon-
der is indifferent increases linearly with the responder’s value. We estimate the
slope of this line by estimating the ratio of the coefficients for value and bribe. The
results are presented at the bottom of Table 3. Interestingly, although the proposer
behavior deviates from the theoretical equilibrium, the estimated ratio in SPA is
not significantly different from the 1:3 ratio implied by the theoretical analysis.17
We analyze the acceptance behavior further by comparing it to the best response to
the observed proposer behavior in Section 5.3.
Themain result for the responder behavior in the collusion stage is the following:
Result 2. Although there are some systematic differences between the two auction mech-
anisms, responder acceptance strategies are similar for FPA and SPA.
Taken together with the previous result, Result 2 implies that successful col-
lusion is similar across the two auction mechanisms. Overall, we find that with
both mechanisms, 42% of all auctions end in successful collusion. Nonetheless, the
auction mechanism has substantial effects on behavior in the auction stage, as we
discuss next.
5.2 Auction stage
Figure 3 depicts the bidding behavior in terms of the scatter plots and mean bids
by value intervals of 5. In order to test our next claims formally, we estimate the
bid function using a mixed effects linear regression with random effects on subjects
16 This learning takes place at the initial part of the experiment, and is not apparent in a regression
restricted to the second half of the experiment (not reported here). None of the interaction terms of period
with auction mechanism, bribe, and responder value are statistically significant if included in the models.
17 While the ratio in FPA is significantly higher than 13 , it is not significantly different from the ratio in
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Figure 3: The bidding function.
Note: Scatter plot of raw bids and mean bids by value intervals of 5 for each type and
treatment. What appears as a 45 degrees line is, in fact, bids set at the bidder’s value.
nested in matching groups, regressing the bid on collusion treatment, auction mech-
anism, role, period, and the bidder’s value and value squared with their interactions
with treatment, auction, and role. Table 4 presents the average marginal slopes of
bids on values by treatments and roles.18
Figure 3 shows that bidding in SPA is mostly concentrated around the weakly
dominant strategy. Across treatments and roles, 62.9% of the bids are set exactly
at the value, and 79.2% set at the value±1, with no significant difference between
treatments or roles. Indeed, the marginal slopes in SPA presented in Table 4 are
close to the rational benchmark of 1, although proposers in SPA-COL bid slightly
but significantly below their value.19
18 The marginal effect of the period variable is highly significant (β = 0.019, p < 0.001). However,
the coefficient is of negligible magnitude, indicating an average increase in bids of 0.019 per period and
less than one unit over the 50 periods of the experiment. See the appendix for the complete regression.
19 This result contrasts with the data reported by Kagel and Levin (1993), who found slight overbidding
in second-price auctions, but it is in line with Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982). Kagel (1995,
p. 511) suggested that the difference is due to Cox et al. (1982) explicitly prohibiting any bids above the
value. We did not prohibit this, but we did explicitly state in the experimental instructions that bidding
above the value may lead to negative payoffs, which may explain underbidding in our data (see appendix).
16
Table 4: Marginal effects of private values on bids.
Treatment Role Marginal slope Std. Error 95% CI
FPA-NOCOL — 0.556 0.004 [0.548 0.564]
FPA-COL Proposer 0.493 0.008 [0.477 0.510]
FPA-COL Responder 0.412 0.010 [0.392 0.431]
SPA-NOCOL — 1.005 0.004 [0.996 1.013]
SPA-COL Proposer 0.952 0.009 [0.935 0.968]
SPA-COL Responder 0.994 0.009 [0.976 1.012]
Notes: Average Marginal slopes of bids on values by treatments and rolesbased on the
regression presented in Table A1.
The typical overbidding with regard to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium pre-
diction of bidding 0.5 of the value (Kagel, 1995) is observed in FPA-NOCOL. The
opportunity to collude, however, leads to lower bids for both proposers and respon-
ders (p < 0.001 for both comparisons). Furthermore, responders bid significantly
less than proposers holding the same value (p < 0.001), as can be seen clearly in
Figure 3. The same pattern is apparent when controlling for the (rejected) bribe.
Panel (a) in Figure 4 plots the predictions of a new regression, conducted on the
Collusion treatments and incorporating the bribe and bribe squared and their inter-
actions with the treatment and role. The results show that, on average, responders
bid higher than proposers. However, part of this gap is driven by the selection at
the collusion stage. Recall that high-value proposers are likely to offer a high bribe,
which in turn is likely to be accepted, whereas responders are more likely to accept
a bribe as their value decreases. Consequently, the value distribution of proposers
who reach the auction stage is shifted down, with a mean value of 40.7 and a stan-
dard deviation of 28.9, whereas the value distribution of responders who reach the
auction stage is shifted up, with a mean value of 62.0 and a standard deviation of
25.9. This is evident in Figure 5, which plots a histogram of valuations by auction
and role. 20
To control for the selection effect, panel (b) of Figure 4 plots the predicted bids
fixing the bidder value at 50. The new plot is generated by replacing each observa-
tion with the bid predicted for the same subject given the actual bribe and a value
of 50. The regression results show no difference between proposer and responder
bids in SPA21 but a clear difference in FPA, which is stated in the next result:
20We report the aggregate distributions across all bribe levels. Nonetheless, the asymmetries arising
from selection remain when controlling for the rejected bribe.
21 It is somewhat odd that predicted bids decrease with higher levels of rejected bribes. This is probably
due to misunderstanding, as less than 9% of bribes were in the high range of above 30, and the rate of
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Figure 4: Bids by treatment and (rejected) bribe.
Note: Predicted bid based on OLS regression incorporating the bribe and bribe
squared and their interactions with the treatment and role. Panel (a) presents the
mean predicted bid. Panel (b) presents the mean predicted bid fixing the bidder’s
value at 50.
Result 3. In first-price auctions with collusion, proposers bid above responders when
controlling for the private value and the rejected bribe. No difference between proposers
and responders is apparent in second-price auctions with collusion.
The mean marginal effect of role in FPA-COL is not large, with proposers bidding
on average 1.95 above responders (p < 0.05). Nonetheless, it is enough to distort
the auction outcomes, as we report in the following sections.
5.3 Best response analysis
Clearly, bidders in the first-price auction with collusion do not play according to
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Figure 5: Histogram of valuations in the auction stage.
Note: Frequency of bidder valuations conditional on reaching the auction stage in
treatments FPA-COL and SPA-COL.
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that bidding is consistent with some mixed-strategies equilibrium.22 In this section
we compare the bidding behavior in FPA-COL to the best response strategies based
on the empirical bids observed in the treatment throughout the experiment. This
analysis serves to test the conjecture that bidders are, on average, best-responding
to the behavior of others, and at the same time provides an insight into the sources
of the inefficiency in first-price auctions with collusion reported in Section 5.5.
For each player and each round, we calculated the optimal bid as the expected
payoff-maximizing bid given the distribution of bids placed by all players in the
opposite role following a rejection of the same bribe as the one offered or rejected
by the player, rounded to an integer, throughout the experiment.23 Panel (a) in
Figure 6 plots the optimal bids compared to the observed bids. Panel (b) in the
same figure plots the predicted difference between the bid and the optimal bid with
95% confidence intervals based on a mixed effects linear regression by role and
rounded value with random effects for subjects nested in matching groups. Bids are
generally close to optimal, suggesting that strategies in the auction subgame ap-
proximate, on average, equilibrium behavior. Importantly, optimal bids mirror the
differences between proposers and responders observed in actual behavior. This
effect in the best-response bids is clearly driven by the selection at the collusion
stage that was briefly discussed in Section 5.2. Successful collusion disproportion-
ally removes proposers with high values and responders with low values from the
auction (as made clear in Figure 5). This gives rise to an asymmetric auction, which
is inherently inefficient as the strong bidder—the responder who rejected a bribe
offer—shades her bid more than the weak bidder—the proposer (Güth et al., 2005;
Maskin and Riley, 2000).
In Section 5.1.2 we saw that responder behavior roughly matches the theoreti-
cal prediction despite the divergent proposer behavior. We can now use the best-
response analysis of the auction data to compute the responders’ optimal acceptance
strategies. Specifically, we calculate for each responder in each round her expected
payoff if bidding optimally. A risk-neutral responder should accept a bribe if and
only if it the bribe is higher than the expected auction payoff. To test whether
acceptance decisions are empirically optimal, Figure 7 plots the predicted proba-
bility of accepting a bribe by responder’s value, separately for optimal accept (i.e.,
the bribe is higher than the expected payoff in the auction under optimal bidding)
and optimal reject.24 We see that when the bribe is lower than what the responder
can expect to obtain in the auction, responders generally do the right thing and
reject the bribe. The 20%–30% acceptance levels for low values may be driven by
22 The theoretical analysis of Rachmilevitch (2013) is restricted to pure strategies.
23 Naturally, this information is not available to the players themselves. The analysis is aimed at
exploring whether behavior in the auction approximates an equilibrium.
24 The figure is based on a mixed effects logistic regression of acceptance decisions on payoff-
maximizing strategy and responder value and their interactions with the auction mechanism with random
effects for subjects nested in matching groups. The two auction mechanism yield an essentially identical




































Figure 6: Optimal bids in first-price auctions with collusion stage (FPA-COL).
Note: Panel (a) plots the optimal bids and the observe bids. Panel (b) plots the pre-
dicted difference between the bid and the optimal bid with 95% confidence intervals
based on a mixed effects linear regression by role and rounded value with random
























Figure 7: Observed and optimal acceptance decisions in FPA-COL.
Note: Predicted probability of accepting bribes when the expected-payoff maximizing
decision is to accept or to reject.
risk aversion—the bribe is certain while the auction payoff is not—or because the
optimal-bid expected payoff in the auction is higher than what bidders actually re-
ceive on average. Conversely, responders with high values are likely to reject bribes
even when they are not expected to gain more in the auction. For example, when
the responder’s value is above 80, unprofitable bribes are rejected in 94.87% of the
cases, but profitable bribes are also rejected as high as 82.05% of the time.
Why are responders rejecting profitable bribes? We see two possible explana-
tions. One is that responders underestimate the proposer’s value and thus overes-
timate their chances of winning the auction. However, given that responders bid,
on average, close to their expected payoff-maximizing bid, this explanation does
not appear to be sufficient. Alternatively, bribe rejections may be motivated by
the same considerations as rejections in the ultimatum game (see Güth and Kocher,
2014, for a recent review of the literature). On average, proposers offer a bribe
equal to 35.3% of their value, so that the proposer stands to receive almost three
times the payoff of the receiver if the bribe is accepted. Conversely, when a prof-
itable bribe (according to our analysis) was rejected, the responder won 43.5% of
the ensuing auctions, with a mean payoff of more than half that of proposers. Thus,
responders may be willing to forgo some of their payoff in order to reduce the in-
equality and increase fairness.25
25 Both outcome- and intention-based notions of fairness can rationalize rejections of offers that favor
the proposer (see, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). As this is not directly related to the main aims of




In this section we analyze the effects of the auction mechanism on the seller revenue
under collusion. Table 5 reports the marginal effects of two mixed effects linear re-
gressions of seller revenue on auctionmechanism, collusion treatment, and proposer
and responder values and their interactions with the treatments. The regressions
reported in columns (1)–(3) include the plays in which the bribe offer was accepted
and the seller received zero revenue. The regressions reported in columns (4)–(5)
include only data from the auction stage.
Without collusion, seller revenue is significantly higher in FPA than in SPA due
to overbidding in FPA (z = .4.9, p < 0.001). With collusion, seller revenue is
substantially lower and does not differ significantly with the auction mechanism
(z = 0.06, p = 0.953). The effect of collusion on the seller’s revenue is predomi-
nantly due to successful collusion. Indeed, the mean price set in the SPA auction is
the same with or without a preceding collusion stage. In FPA, in contrast, the effect
is two-fold, as the low bribes push the bids down (cf. Table 4), leading to a loss of
seller revenue on top of the revenue lost due to successful collusion.
The effect of the bidders’ values on seller revenue provides an insight into the
processes determining the seller revenue under collusion. Naturally, without col-
lusion the mean seller revenue increases with both proposer and responder value
under both auction mechanisms. Collusion introduces two new effects. In the col-
lusion stage, a higher proposer value implies a higher chance of acceptance of the
bribe offer and thus a lower mean seller revenue, and vice versa for responders.
In the auction stage, the selection effect implies that responders have, on average,
higher values than proposers. Since the final price in FPA is determined by the high
bid and in SPA by the low bid, it is more sensitive to the responder value in the
former and the proposer value in the latter. The two effects lead to a counterintu-
itive result in FPA-COL: since a higher proposer value facilitates collusion and only
has a mild effect on the auction price, seller revenue is negatively correlated with
proposer value. The next result summarizes the findings with respect to the seller
revenue.
Result 4. Contrary to Hypothesis 3, collusion is more detrimental to seller revenue in
FPA than in SPA. Under collusion, both auction mechanisms generate the same seller
revenue. In first-price auctions, an increase in the proposer value leads to a decrease in
seller revenue.
5.5 (In)Efficiency
Inefficient allocations arise when the good is allocated to the bidder with the lower
valuation. These can be generated either because (i) the bidder who has the lowest
value is able to bribe the bidder with the higher value to refrain from bidding and
thus win the auction or (ii) the lower-value bidder wins the auction by placing



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Treatment Observations Predicted Observed Predicted Observed
Collusion Stage
FPA-COL 506 (42.17%) 0.00% 14.23% 0.00% 4.07%
SPA-COL 506 (42.17%) 25.00% 15.22% 4.17% 4.48%
Auction Stage
FPA-COL 694 (57.83%) 0.00% 18.44% 0.00% 4.30%
SPA-COL 694 (57.83%) 0.00% 2.59% 0.00% 0.66%
FPA-NOCOL 1,200 (100%) 0.00% 10.92% 0.00% 2.03%
SPA-NOCOL 1,200 (100%) 0.00% 3.58% 0.00% 0.75%
Overall
FPA-COL 1,200 0.00% 16.67% 0.00% 4.21%
SPA-COL 1,200 16.67% 7.92% 2.78% 2.28%
FPA-NOCOL 1,200 0.00% 10.92% 0.00% 2.03%
SPA-NOCOL 1,200 0.00% 3.58% 0.00% 0.75%
Notes: Proportion of efficient allocations and relative efficiency loss in the collusion stage (conditional on
accepted bribe), in the auction stage (conditional on reaching the auction stage), and at the aggregate level.
auction inefficiency. Table 6 displays the observed levels of inefficiency both at the
aggregate level and disaggregated by the type of inefficiency. The table displays two
different measures. The first measure is the proportion of inefficient allocations. While
informative, the previous measure does not reflect the magnitude of the efficiency
loss. We therefore define the relative efficiency loss: one minus the ratio of the value
of the auction winner (realized surplus) to the maximum of the two values (maximal
possible surplus).
Let’s analyze the two stages in turn, starting with the collusion stage. The the-
oretical analysis predicts a substantial proportion of inefficient allocations due to
accepted bribes in SPA (Eső and Schummer, 2004): 25% of accepted bribes re-
sult in an inefficient allocation and the expected loss of efficiency is 4.17%. The
observed proportion of inefficient allocations in SPA in the collusion stage is 10
percentage points lower than predicted. Regardless, the observed magnitude of ef-
ficiency loss is sometimes higher than in the theoretical equilibrium. Recall than
in equilibrium, the lowest possible efficiency is obtained when a proposer with a
25
value of 66.67 bribes a responder with a value of 100 for a relative efficiency loss
of 13 . In the experiment, however, proposers with very low values are sometimes
successful in bribing responders with very high values. Consequently, the mean
relative efficiency loss is even slightly higher than predicted despite the lower rate
of successful collusion.
Rachmilevitch (2013) predicts no inefficient allocations in FPA. However, col-
lusion inefficiency is not noticeably lower in FPA with either of the two measures.
This is in line with the results reported above, namely that both bribe offers and



















Figure 8: Efficiency in first-price auctions.
Note: Efficient allocations in the auction by proposer and responder value. Dark (red)
regions indicate that the bidder with the lower value won the auction.
Next we analyze efficiency in the auction stage. Allocations in SPA tend to be ef-
ficient, with the high-value bidder winning in 96.4% of all cases in SPA-NOCOL and
97.4% in SPA-COL—not surprising, given that bidders generally bid their value. In
comparison, allocations in FPA-NOCOL are efficient only in 89.1% of the time, drop-
ping to 81.6% with collusion.26 Figure 8 plots (in)efficient allocations as a function
26 The inefficiency levels in the no-collusion treatments are similar to those previously observed in
the literature. Efficiency in Cox et al. (1982), for example, is remarkably similar to our findings, with
12.14% and 6.00% inefficient allocations and efficiency losses of 1.12% and 0.35% in FPA and SPA, respec-
tively. Kagel and Levin (1993), on the other hand, observed higher proportions of inefficient allocations,
18% and 21% in FPA and SPA, respectively. See Footnote 19 above for a related discussion.
26
Table 7: Regressions on auction efficiency.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Allocationa Efficiencyb Allocationa Efficiencyb
COL -0.689* -0.022*** 0.174 -0.001
(0.341) (0.006) (0.420) (0.008)
SPA 1.565*** 0.013* 1.401*** 0.008
(0.374) (0.005) (0.423) (0.006)
COL x SPA 0.928 0.023** 0.120 0.009
(0.558) (0.008) (0.709) (0.011)
Proposer low -0.070 -0.004
(0.207) (0.004)
COL x Proposer low -1.177*** -0.027***
(0.347) (0.008)
SPA x Proposer low 0.357 0.010
(0.393) (0.006)
COL x SPA x Proposer low 1.026 0.015
(0.705) (0.011)
Difference in values 0.081*** 0.000*** 0.085*** 0.000***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Period 0.018*** 0.000*** 0.018*** 0.000***
(0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Constant 0.033 0.957*** 0.009 0.958***
(0.276) (0.005) (0.298) (0.005)
Observations 3,788 3,788 3,788 3,788
Number of groups 24 24 24 24
Notes: Mixed effects alogistic and blinear regressions with random effects for subjects nested
in matching groups. Allocation refers to the frequency of efficient allocations. Efficiency refers
to relative efficiency. Proposer Low is a dummy indicating that the proposer has a lower value.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels,
respectively.
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of the proposer and responder value in the FPA treatments. While the plot is sym-
metric along the diagonal in FPA-NOCOL, it is markedly asymmetric in FPA-COL,
with most of the inefficient allocations appearing above the diagonal (i.e., when
the responder has a higher value than the proposer). The mixed effects logistic
regressions reported in Table 7 support this observation. Not surprisingly, auction
efficiency is higher in second-price auctions, after the bidders gain experience, and
when the difference between the two values is large. Efficiency is significantly re-
duced with collusion only in the first-price auction—but not when the proposer has
a higher value. This is a consequence of the observation summarized in Result 3—
namely that proposers bid higher than responders in FPA-NOCOL.
Given that direct loss of efficiency due to collusion is similar in FPA and SPA, it is
not surprising that the last result carries over to overall efficiency. Taking together
loss of efficiency due to accepted bribes and loss of efficiency at the auction stage,
we find a 16.7% rate of inefficient allocations in FPA-COL compared to only 7.9%
in SPA-COL. Relative loss of efficiency is 4.2% in FPA-COL compared to only 2.3%
in SPA-COL. Mixed effects linear and logistic regressions confirm that the difference
is significant (p < 0.001 for both measures).
Result 5. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, first-price auctions are less efficient than second-
price auctions under collusion. Loss of efficiency in the collusion stage is similar under
both auction mechanisms; the differences are generated in the auction stage.
6 Summary and concluding remarks
The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that first-price auctions
deters collusion by providing incentives to misrepresent private information. This
paper studies this claim by experimentally implementing a simple negotiation pro-
tocol that (a) was formally analyzed in the theoretical literature and (b) allows for
the breakdown of negotiations and is therefore conducive to studying the effects of
collusion on continuation auctions.
While we don’t find any systematic differences in collusion between first-price
and second-price auctions, the results give rise to a new insight hitherto lacking
from the analysis of collusion in auctions: Unsuccessful collusive attempts distort
the auction behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions.27 This distortion
may eliminate desirable features of the auction mechanism and, as in our experi-
mental auction, reduce revenue and efficiency. Looking at the expected revenue of
the auctioneer, we find that collusion eliminates the advantage of first-price auc-
tions, which systematically results in higher revenues without collusion (Kagel and
Levin, 1993).
This conclusion may appear to depend on the asymmetry imposed by the ultima-
tum bargaining protocol, which is admittedly stylized and unrealistic. Nonetheless,
27 Similarly, Kirchkamp et al. (2009) have shown that the introduction of outside options affects the
theoretical equilibrium bids, as well as the empirical deviation from equilibrium, in FPA but not in SPA.
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asymmetries are likely to arise in natural settings as well. Side payments may be
made more easily by one competing firm than by another for financial or organi-
zational reasons; for example, if one firm is a supplier of the other, or if one has
liquidity constraints. Bargaining power can also vary for various reasons from the
individual characteristics of the negotiators to the economic and political assets of
the firms. Our setup should be viewed as an extreme case of more natural environ-
ments, which we use as a controlled workhorse with which to study the basic issues
associated with collusion negotiation than for its ecological plausibility.
While our results clearly demonstrate that information revelation in failed col-
lusive negotiations distort bidding behavior in first-price auctions, more work is
needed to determine how and which of the specific effects generalize beyond the
specific protocol. In particular, the loss of efficiency may be mitigated if the col-
luding cartel can choose the identity of the designated winner endogenously. How-
ever, Noussair and Seres (2017) studied second-price auctions with affiliated values,
where collusion is predicted to reduce efficiency by efficiently assigning the iden-
tity of the designated winner. Contrary to this prediction, both the opportunity to
collude and actual successful collusion resulted in loss of efficiency, suggesting that
allowing for endogenous choice of the designated winner will not alter our qualita-
tive conclusions. Therefore, more empirical evidence is required to determine the
boundaries of our results.
Our paper joins other experimental papers that compare auction mechanisms
with respect to robustness to collusion, but highlights a new channel through which
collusion affects auction outcomes. Other studies that have found that first-price
auctions are not as robust to collusion as theory predicts include Hinloopen and On-
derstal (2013) for centralized cartel formation without commitment and Agranov
and Yariv (2014) for free communication without commitment.28 Our results intro-
duce the role of information revelation, and reveal the potentially negative harmful
implications of using the first-price rule.
The theoretical treatment of collusion in auctions typically assumes fully ratio-
nal players and frictionless bargaining, leading to successful and efficient collusion
when the collusive agreement is enforceable (e.g., Marshall and Marx, 2007). In
practice, however, collusion attempts may fail for various reasons ranging from the
individual characteristics of the negotiators to institutional restrictions on commu-
nication and/or transfers. Our experimental design brings the implications of a
failure to collude to the fore. Future research will determine the conditions under
which the detrimental effects of collusion in first-price auctions that are apparent
in our experimental setup are likely to arise.
28 See also Fischer et al. (2014), who found that first-price auctions do not generate higher seller
revenue compared to second-price auctions if there is a non-negligible probability that one bidder’s bid
leaks to the other bidder.
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Appendix: Regression for Table 4




























Number of groups 24 12
Notes: Mixed effects linear regression with random ef-
fects for subjects nested in matching groups. Standard er-
rors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗ ,∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively.
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Appendix: Instructions for FPA-COL and SPA-COL
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain quiet
and switch off your mobile phone. It is important that you do not talk to other
participants during the entire experiment. Please read the instructions carefully,
the better you understand the instructions the more money you will be able to earn.
The instructions are the same for all participants. If you have further questions
after reading the instructions, please give us a sign by raising your hand out of your
cubicle. We will then approach you in order to answer your questions personally.
Please do not ask aloud.
The experiment consists of two phases. The first phase is a practice phase, in
which you will have the opportunity to familiarize yourself with the software and
the rules of the experiments in a non binding way. In the second phase you will
interact in 50 rounds with other participants. In each of these 50 rounds you can
earn money. How much money you earn will depend on your own decision, those
of the other participants and partly on chance. At the end of the experiment, the
computer will randomly select 5 rounds and you will earn the payoffs you obtained
in these rounds. Each of the 50 rounds has the same chance of being selected.
During the experiment all sums of money are listed in ECU (for Experimental
Currency Unit). Your earnings during the experiment will be converted to e at the
end and paid to you in cash. The exchange rate is 10 ECU = 1 e. The earnings
from all parts will be added to a participation fee ofe4. If the earnings are negative,
we will subtract them from your participation fee.
Instructions for the experiment
At the beginning of the second phase of the experiment, all participants will be
assigned a role. Half of the participants will be assigned the role of Person X and
the other half will be assigned the role of Person Y. These roles will remain fixed
throughout the experiment. In each round, two participants, one in the role od X
and one in the role of Ywill interact with each other. Which participant in the other
role you interact with will be randomly chosen at the beginning of each round.
The sequence of the round
A round consists of two stages, which are explained in detail below. In the second
stage, Person X and Person Y participate in an auction. Both participants can bid
for a token. The token is worth a certain amount to each participant, which we
call the participant’s Value. The computer will determine this Value separately
for each participant in each round by choosing a two decimal number between
0 and 100, where each number is equally likely to be chosen. detailed instructions
for this second stage follow the instructions for the first stage below.
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Detailed instructions for Stage 1
In Stage 1, Person X can offer to pay a certain amount to Person Y not to partici-
pate in the auction (in Stage 2). Person X can choose any two decimal number
between 0 and 100 to offer to Person Y. Person X can also choose not to make
an offer by choosing an amount of 0.
If Person X decides to not to make an offer or if Person Y rejects the offer, Stage 1
will end and the participants will proceed to Stage 2.
If Person Y accepts the offer, Person X will receive the Value that the token has
for him or her minus the amount offered to Person Y. Person Y will receive the
offered amount regardless of the Value the token has for him or her. This will end
the round, and the participants will be rematched for the next round.
Detailed instructions for Stage 2
First-price auction
In this stage, each participant will choose how much to bid in the auction. This
Bid can be any two decimal number between 0 and 100. The participant who
makes the higher Bid receives the Value the token has for him or her. Out of
this value he or she pays his or her Bid. The participant who makes the lower
Bid receives nothing, and his or her payoff for that round is zero. In the case that
both participants make the same bid, the computer will randomly select one of the
participants and the selected participant will receive the Value the token has for
him or her. Out of this value he or she pays his or her Bid. The participant who is
not selected receives nothing, and his or her payoff for that round is zero.
Note that if you get the token by bidding higher that the value it has for you,
you will receive a negative payoff. You can guarantee not to receive a negative
payoff in the round by bidding no more than the value the token has for you.
Second-price auction
In this stage, each participant will choose how much to bid in the auction. This
Bid can be any two decimal number between 0 and 100. The participant who
makes the higher Bid receives the Value the token has for him or her. Out of this
value he or she pays the Bid made by the other participant. The participant who
makes the lower Bid receives nothing, and his or her payoff for that round is zero.
In the case that both participants make the same bid, the computer will randomly
select one of the participants and the selected participant will receive the Value the
token has for him or her. Out of this value he or she pays the Bid of the other
participant (which in this case, is equal to his bid). The participant who is not
selected receives nothing, and his or her payoff for that round is zero.
Note that if you get the token by bidding higher that the value it has for you,
you might receive a negative payoff. You can guarantee not to receive a negative
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payoff in the round by bidding no more than the value the token has for you.
The end of the round
At the end of the round you will be reminded of the Value the token has for you and
your decisions. We will also inform you about the Value the token has for other
participant, his or her choices in the round, and your payoff for the round.
The practice phase
Before the main part of the experiment starts, you will be able to familiarize yourself
with the procedure in a practice phase. In this phase you will decide as both Person
X and as Person Y. That is, you will first decide on an offer as Person X. If you
make an offer, you will decide as Person Y whether to accept or reject it. If you
decide not to make an offer as Person X or to reject an offer as Person Y, you will
proceed to the second stage. Here, again, you will decide as both Person X and as
Person Y. You will receive 10 minutes, in which you can repeat the procedure for
as many rounds as you wish.
The end of the experiment
After you have completed the fifty rounds, your final payoff will be calculated and
presented to you. We will then ask you to complete a short questionnaire, which
we need for the statistical analysis of the experimental data. The data of the ques-
tionnaire, as well as all your decisions during the experiments will be anonymous.
Please remain seated until your cabin number is called.
Thank you for participating in this experiment and have a nice day!
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